This paper models the competition of user networks as a continuous-time Markov process. It presents a dynamic version of the Discrete Choice Analysis with state-dependent choice probabilities. Among other things, we show that the network competition can be characterized by the coexistence of lock-in regimes and a 'metastable' state -i.e. a state which is a probability maximum for an arbitrary long but finite length of time. Then, unlike in the case of ergodicity or of simple lock-in scenarios, the networks can coexist for a considerable time span, although the market is a natural monopoly.
Introduction
Often the utility from the use of a good depends positively on the total number of users of this good. In this case, the totality of users of this good constitute a user network. Obvious examples are communication systems such as fax and e-mail systems. Here a growth in the number of users directly induces positive network effects, because then each user can contact and be contacted by more users. Moreover, most information processing systems and a lot of consumer electronics systems are characterized by network effects as well. Clear examples are hardware-software systems such as computer systems or home video systems. Here the network effects are market-mediated: an increasing number of users leads to a rising variety of software, and this in turn results in a higher utility of each user. The following analysis of the competition of two incompatible user networks, A and B, focuses on those cases where the choice of a network is not binding. A user's decisions are modeled as a sequence of discrete choices which are, due to the network effects, state-dependent. Furthermore, in line with the Discrete Choice Approach, his willingness to pay is subject to exogeneous information and/or technology shocks, so that his choices are guided by state-dependent choice rates. In order to take into account that the user can review and revise his last choice whenever he wants, we treat time as a continuous variable, i.e. we follow a Master Equation Approach.
Our analysis shows that three qualitatively different outcomes are possible. Firstly, the probability distribution of the network sizes can converge to a unique continuous stationary distribution, i.e. the stochastic processes can be 'ergodic'. Otherwise either one of the two boundary states 'all users are in network A' and 'all users are in network B' is a unique probability mass 'absorbing' state or both these states are absorbing. Here two cases have to be distinguished. In the first case, the absorbing state(s) is (are) the only equilibrium point(s) of the corresponding deterministic model. Then there is a strong tendency towards the realization of a monopoly, i.e. the stochastic process is quickly 'locked in' to one of the networks. In the second case, the absorbing state(s) is (are) accompanied by a 'metastable' state which corresponds with a stable interior equilibrium of the corresponding deterministic model. Then this state can be a probability maximum for an arbitrary long time span, i.e. the competing networks can coexist for a considerable period of time, although the market is a natural monopoly. This can only happen if it is taken into account that network effects typically decrease with increasing network size, i.e. that the rise in each user's willingness to pay for a network induced by an additional user is smaller the larger the network is.
Pioneering work in the modeling of consumer behavior as a stochastic process with state dependence is Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) and Arthur et al. (1987) . There, however, discrete-time processes are analyzed. 1 Furthermore, the nonlinear Polya processes popularized by Arthur are restricted to the modeling of irreversible choices. Our continuous-time approach with endogenous review rates follows the Master Equation Approach presented in Weidlich and Haag (1983) . 2 However, whereas usually the transition rates of the stochastic processes are specified by behavioral assumptions, we present a version of the Master Equation Approach in which they are microfounded along the lines of the Discrete Choice Approach (for the latter, see de Palma and Lefevre, 1983) . The central aim of our paper is to introduce the concept of metastability into economic analysis. Following van Kampen (1992), p. 328, 'metastability' denotes the coexistence of absorbing boundary states with a stable interior equilibrium state of the corresponding deterministic model which is a local probability maximum of the stochastic process for an arbitrary long but finite time span. We see this concept as central for the understanding of the evolution of markets for network effect goods, because it can explain the often observed long-term coexistence of competing user networks against the background that almost every user network has to exceed a critical mass, i.e. that in most cases both lock-in regimes exist.
In Section 2 the choice rates are derived and aggregated to a master equation. In Section 3 we analyze the cases of ergodicity and of lock-ins in the absence of metastable states under the assumption that the network effects are approximately constant. Finally, in Section 4, we allow for the fact that network effects are typically decreasing and discuss the concept of metastability.
The model

Basic assumptions
Our model of the competition of two user networks aims at analyzing those cases in which the network choice is not binding and where each user can review and revise his choice whenever he wants. We have in mind users who, for example, own both a console for video-game cartridges and a PC with a CD drive (i.e. both hardware components), and who have to decide on whether they next buy a video game or a PC game (i.e. which kind of software to buy next). The current network membership of a user is determined by his last software choice, and the last software choices of all users determine the current network sizes. For simplicity, the total 'mass' of users is normalized to one, so that the total size of a network is identical with its market share. Furthermore, we suppose that the total number of users is very high and that they cannot coordinate their choices. 3 As for the basic product characteristics, the two networks are assumed to be horizontally differentiated à la Hotelling with network A at the left-end point and network B at the right-end point of the unit line; i.e. network A has address i = 0 and network B has address i = 1.
A user's willingnesses to pay for being a member of network A and for being a member of network B consist of two parts, the 'basic' willingness to pay which depends on product characteristics and that part which goes back to direct and/or market-mediated network effects and which is subsequently called 'network effect function':
• With regard to the basic willingness to pay, we assume that it is, at each point of time, uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line, where the address 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 of a user refers to his relative preference for a network as far as product characteristics are considered (but not network sizes). The horizontal alienation effects ('transportation costs') are linear with regard to the distance between A (at i = 0) or B (at i = 1) and the user's address. Hence, the alienation terms amount to −hi with respect to network A and to −h(1 − i) with respect to network B, where the parameter h can be seen as a measure of the extent of horizontal product differentiation. Taking into account address-independent parts k A and k B , we obtain for network A, k A − hi, and for network B, k B − h(1 − i). We suppose that network A can have a systematic quality advantage, so that k A ≥ k B holds.
• With regard to the network effect function, i.e. that part of the willingness to pay which goes back to the network effects, we assume that users do not differ in their valuation of the network effects and that the network effects are constant (c = 1) or decreasing (c < 1; the former is considered as an approximation for only modestly decreasing network effects). Hence, with x and 1 − x as the size (market share) of network A and network B, respectively, the network effect functions read nx c for A and n(1 − x) c for B, where the parameter n is a measure of the 'network effect strength'. This parameter shows how strong the positive relationship between the demand for (size of) a network and the willingness to pay for being a member of this network is. Its value depends, among other things, on the size of the fixed costs of software production. The lower the fixed costs of introducing a new software variant are, the more new variants are induced by a certain increase in demand. Considering current user costs g A and g B , we presume that the (eventual) systematic quality advantage of network A is not overcompensated by higher costs, so that k A − g A ≥ k B − g B holds. In the following, the difference k A − g A is denoted as a A and the difference k B − g B as a B . Hence, the difference between a user's total willingness to pay for being a member of network A or B and its current user costs -i.e. his current surplus from being a member of the respective network -can be formulated as
and
respectively. Here, the difference a A −a B ≥ 0 is the 'systematic basic advantage' of network A and is subsequently denoted as b. It is the systematic part of A's 'basic advantage' b i = b + h(1 − 2i) (which can be negative).
In line with the Discrete Choice Analysis, we take into account that a user's address i, i.e. his relative preference for a network as far as product characteristics are considered, is a random variable due to exogeneous technology and information shocks concerning the product features of the networks' components. An example is the supply of a new software component which is very innovative (such as the first three-dimensional version of a popular PC game). In our model, the occurrence of such a very innovative component is an exogeneous technology shock. Moreover, as most hardware-software systems are experience goods, the information about product features, e.g. about the 'look and feel' of a new computer software, significantly affects network choices. Hence, whether a user chooses, for example, the newest version of Microsoft's Explorer or Netscape's Communicator depends, among other things, on what his friends and colleagues told him about these alternatives. In our model, such information gathering is assumed to be a random process and its influence on network choice manifests itself in information shocks. We assume that the random variable i is uniformly distributed along the unit line. Together with the assumption of a high total number of users, this results in the uniform distribution of users at each point in time discussed above. Hence, h can be re-interpreted as a measure for the significance of the exogeneous shocks. An underlying simplifying assumption is that the new address of a user does not depend on his address before a shock. Hence, although users' preferences are heterogeneous at each point in time, the probabilities for choosing network A and for choosing network B are the same for all users (at a point in time). 4
The individual decisions: choice probabilities
A user with current (new) address i chooses A whenever s iA > s iB holds. Using Eqs.
(1) and (2), this condition can be formulated as
As i is uniformly distributed between zero and one, B's basic advantage is uniformly distributed between −b − h and −b + h. Hence, its cumulative distribution is
By substituting A's network size advantage for B's basic advantage, we obtain the choice probabilities of network A as
The choice probabilities of network B are β(x) = 1 − α(x). These state-dependent choice probabilities are the probabilities that network A or B is chosen given that a user, due to an exogeneous shock, reviews his last choice. For the special case of constant network effects (c = 1), we obtain
The evolution of networks: master equations
In order to derive the equations of motion for the probability distribution of A's network size x, let us suppose (for a moment) that time is a discrete variable. Let us further assume that the process is a one-step process, i.e. that in fixed time intervals τ (only) one of the users reviews his choice (on the occasion of a software purchase). Moreover, let the probability of doing so be the same for each user, and let be the inverse of the number of users. Then if at a point in time t the state x is realized, the probability that at time t + τ the state x + is realized amounts to A(x) = (1 − x)α(x): a member of network B reviews his choice (appears at the market) and chooses network A. Analogously, the transition probability for transitions from state x to state x − reads B = xβ (x) . If at time t one of the two neighboring states x − and x + is realized, the transition probabilities for transitions to state x are
, respectively. Hence, the Chapman-Kolmogorov forward equation for this discrete-time Markov process is
So far the time span τ which elapses until a review takes place is constant and exogeneously given. As we want to endogenize it, we pass over to continuous-time processes. In general this requires an expansion of the discrete-time transition probabilities in a Taylor series around a point in time and the subsequent calculation of its limit for τ → 0 in order to obtain the continuous-time transition rates (hazard rates). In the case of our one-step process with (state-)discrete choices, however, every realization of the process after any small time interval τ -no matter how small -retains the same value of x with a certain probability or attains a value which differs by > 0 with the complementary probability. Hence, the short-term behavior of a realization of the process is characterized by phases of constant x which are interrupted by jumps of size > 0. In the case of such a short-term behavior, the choice and transition rates differ from the choice and transition probabilities only with regard to their general level, i.e. they are of the same functional form (see Honerkamp, 1994, p. 171f ). Thus, with 0 < θ < 1, the master equation of the corresponding continuous-time Markov process can be written aṡ
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and withṖ (x; t) = ∂P (x; t)/∂t. This master equation can be seen as a probability flux balance, where the first line yields the probability influx into a state x, and the second line yields the probability outflux from this state. In the following, in order to avoid notational clutter, we rescale time with 1/θ . Formally, this means dividing the right-hand side of Eq. (5) (but not the left-hand side) by θ . 5 In the absence of network effects, i.e. with constant choice rates α and β, the master equation would be linear in x and a closed differential equation system for the motion of all moments of the probability distribution could be derived from it (see van Kampen, 1992, p. 149ff) . For n > 0, no such explicit dynamic solution is feasible. However, an approximate solution can be obtained insofar as x is a quasi-continuous variable and as long as the transition rates are continuously differentiable. Then the master equation can be approximated by a state-continuous Fokker-Planck equation, from which we can derive a differential equation system for the moments. While the first condition is, due to our assumption of a high total number of users, always fulfilled, the second condition requires that the choice rates do not take on the values zero and one. If the latter is not fulfilled, the nonlinear process can be analyzed by means of its corresponding deterministic model (the 'macroequation'). In the next section both the approximate solution via the Fokker-Planck equation and the analysis via the corresponding deterministic model is carried out for the case of (approximately) constant network effects.
Network competition with constant network effects: ergodicity versus lock-ins
Ergodicity
In the case of constant network effects, the choice rate of network B remains positive with x = 1 for n < h − b (and the choice rate of network A remains positive with x = 0 for n < h + b; see Eq. (4)). Then the transition rates are continuously differentiable and the master equation can be approximated by a state-continuous Fokker-Planck equation. The condition n < h − b is met if both n < h and b < h − n holds, i.e. if the network effects are 'relatively weak' (compared to the extent of the horizontal differentiation or exogeneous shocks) and A's systematic basic advantage is 'relatively low' (compared to the difference between the extent of the horizontal differentiation or exogeneous shocks and the network effect strength). Then sooner or later all states have a positive probability of being realized, so that every process is sooner or later characterized by a continuous probability distribution which covers all states.
As an example, Fig. 1 shows three transient probability distributions which are numeric simulations calculated by means of the master equation with h = 1, n = 0.5 and b = 0.2 for an initial condition x(t = 0) = x 0 = 0. Then, in the first stage, the whole distribution moves towards higher x-values, and sooner or later, due to b > 0, the most probable x-value is higher than 0.5. Obviously, during the whole process, the distribution remains unimodal, relatively sharply peaked and more or less symmetric. Hence, the evolution of the mean value of the distribution is a good approximation for the most probable trajectory of a realization of the process. For t → ∞, the transient distributions converge to the stationary distribution shown in Fig. 2 (dotted) . Once this stationary distribution has been reached, the Fig. 2 . Stationary probability distributions of three ergodic processes (c = 1, h = 1).
probability of a state is equivalent to its relative frequency realized in the course of time; this is the 'ergodic property' (see van Kampen, 1992, p. 93) . Therefore, the moments of the stationary probability distribution are of the same value as the moments calculated from a realized trajectory (provided that it is long enough). Obviously, ergodicity of the stochastic process means coexistence of competing user networks.
In order to obtain some general results, we derive the state-continuous Fokker-Planck equation by expanding the master equation as a Taylor series up to the second-order term. 6 This leads tȯ
with
The drift D(x) can be interpreted as the systematic part of the process, and the fluctuation term F (x) as the influence of the random shocks. By multiplication of the Fokker-Planck equation with x or x 2 and subsequent partial integration, we obtain the dynamic mean-value equation as
and the differential equation for the second moment results as ẋ 2 = 2 xD(x) + F (x) .
Hence, the differential equation for the variance is
From Eq. (9), it becomes clear that the drift of the stochastic process gives the best possible approximation for the most probable trajectory of a realization. With ẋ = 0, we obtain (the best approximation of) the most probable state after the stationary distribution has been reached:
According to Eq. (10), the variance of the stationary distribution is
Hence, a higher systematic basic advantage b (with b < h − n) of A, for example due to lower software prices, leads on average to a higher network size of A as well as to a lower variance. The two stationary distributions for n = 0.5 depicted in Fig. 2 provide an example. From Eq. (11), we can deduce that network effects work like a multiplier of a systematic basic advantage and that a higher network effect strength (with n < h) results on average in a larger size of A (given b > 0). Moreover, as long as b is not too high, a higher n means a higher variance, i.e. stronger network effects make the network competition more uncertain. Fig. 2 provides an example for b = 0.
The drift D(x) serves not only as the approximate mean-value equation but also as the corresponding deterministic modelẋ = α(x) − x of the process. Its equilibria x * result from Eq. (11) and, as long as the process is ergodic, the following correspondence holds (cf. van Kampen, 1992, p. 254ff): stable equilibria of the deterministic model correspond with (local) maxima of the stationary distribution of the stochastic process, and unstable equilibria of the deterministic model correspond with local minima of the stationary distribution of the stochastic process. If the process is not ergodic, but rather absorbing states exist, the whole probability mass is absorbed by these states for t → ∞. Here stable equilibria of the deterministic model correspond with states which are (local) probability maxima for a finite period of time.
Lock-ins
If the ergodicity condition n < h − b is not fulfilled, two qualitatively different cases have to be examined. For h − b < n < h + b, B's choice rate takes on a value of zero if x is high, but A's choice rate remains positive even for x = 0. In contrast, if n > h + b holds, both choice rates can become zero. The first case is characterized by a 'relatively high' systematic basic advantage of user network A: if the network effects are relatively weak (n < h), b > h − n holds, and if the network effects are relatively strong (n > h), b > n − h holds. Here, due to the fact that choices are reversible, sooner or later each realization of the process must be locked in to A. From Eq. (4), the interior boundary state of the lock-in regime can be calculated as x ,A = 0.5 + (h − b)/(2n). Once a realization of the process has entered the lock-in regime x ,A ≤ x ≤ 1, the only question is whether a member of A appears at the market and chooses A again or whether a member of B appears and switches to A. However, sooner or later all users are members of network A, i.e. x = 1 is an absorbing state.
Whereas in this first case the final market outcome is always an A-monopoly, the second case is characterized by the fact that it is a priori uncertain which network will prevail. Here the network effects are relatively strong (n > h), and the systematic basic advantage is relatively low (b < n − h). In this case, both lock-in regimes exist, and the interior boundary state for lock-ins to network B is x ,B = 0.5 − (h + b)/(2n). The two states x ,A and x ,B are the critical masses of network B and A, respectively, which must be exceeded in order to enter the market. As in reality most user networks possess a critical mass, we subsequently focus on processes with both lock-in regimes.
Using Eq. (7) and taking into account the lock-in regimes, we obtain the corresponding deterministic model of the second case aṡ
Here this deterministic model cannot be interpreted as an approximation of the mean-value equation, but it reflects some qualitative features of the stochastic process. It has three equilibria: x = 0, x = 1 and an interior equilibrium x * which can be calculated from Eq. (11). The two boundary equilibria are stable (the eigenvalues are ∂ẋ/∂x = −1) and correspond with the absorbing states of the stochastic process. In contrast, the interior equilibrium is unstable (∂ẋ/∂x = n/ h − 1 > 0 due to n > h). This means that every realization of the process with an interior initial condition x ,B < x 0 < x ,A more or less quickly enters one of the lock-in regimes.
In Fig. 3 , this is demonstrated for a stochastic process with h = 1, n = 2 and b = 0.6. From Eq. (13), we can calculate that there are two large lock-in regimes with x ,B = 0.1 and x ,A = 0.6 and that the unstable interior equilibrium amounts to x * = 0.2. The three depicted transient distributions are calculated by means of the master equation (where we Fig. 3 . Transient probability distributions of a process with both lock-in regimes for x 0 = 0.24 (c = 1, h = 1, n = 2, b = 0.6). now have to take into account that inside the lock-in regimes the probability mass can flow in only one direction). Starting the process with x 0 = 0.24, initially the distributions have a unique maximum near this state. But due to the competition of the absorbing boundary states for probability mass, they soon become bimodal. In the first stage, there are two local interior maxima inside the lock-in regimes, but both the absorbing states become most probable relatively quickly. As the process progresses, they absorb all probability mass before t = 500 is reached. Fig. 4 depicts the influence of the initial condition, of the network effect strength and of the systematic basic advantage on the outcome of the network competition. There we have depicted the numerically calculated relationship between the stationary lock-in-to-A probability and the initial condition for n = 2 and b = 0 as well as for n = 1.1 and b = 0.06 (and h = 1 in both cases). It turns out that these relationships are functions with turning points at the interior equilibria (which are x * = 0.5 and x * = 0.2, respectively). Of course, a higher systematic basic advantage of network A due to lower prices and/or higher quality shifts the whole function to the left. Moreover, the significance of the initial condition on the success probabilities of network A is higher, the stronger the network effects are. In other words, stronger network effects make the process more deterministic.
Network competition with decreasing network effects: metastability
Usually, network effects become noticeably weaker with increasing network size. If this fact is taken into account, we can explain why competing user networks often coexist for a considerably long time, although one or both networks have a critical mass -i.e. although the market is a natural monopoly. The key for explaining this phenomenon is the concept of metastability: one or both lock-in regimes can coexist with an interior (local) probability maximum which can be arbitrarily long-lived.
Examining the conditions for the existence of lock-in regimes with c < 1, it becomes clear that they are the same as with c = 1: for x → 1, we have x c −(1−x) c → 1, i.e. (h−b)/n < 1 results in the existence of a lock-in-to-A regime; and for x → 0, we have x c −(1−x) c → −1, i.e. (h+b)/n < 1 results in the existence of a lock-in-to-B regime. 7 In the case of ergodicity, it makes no qualitative difference whether the network effects are (approximately) constant or (noticeably) decreasing. In the presence of lock-in regimes, however, the existence of a metastable state changes the characteristics of a stochastic process considerably. As in the previous section, we focus on processes with both lock-in regimes.
If the network effects are constant, the eigenvalues of the corresponding deterministic models amount to n/ h − 1 (as long as x ,B < x < x ,A ), i.e. they are x-independent. In contrast, if the network effects are decreasing, not only the value of the eigenvalues is state-dependent, but also their sign can be state-dependent. Fromẋ = α(x) − x with α(x) according to Eq. (4), we obtain
This is a parabolic function with its minimum at x = 0.5, where the minimum eigenvalue is ∂ẋ/∂x = cn2 1−c /h − 1. Furthermore, lim x→0 ∂ẋ/∂x = lim x→1 ∂ẋ/∂x = +∞ holds, i.e. for (very) low as well as for (very) high x-values, the eigenvalues are always positive. Hence, there are two parameter regimes:
• For n/ h > 0.5 1−c /c, the minimum eigenvalue is positive. Thenẋ is increasing over the entire range x ,B < x < x ,A , so that there is either a unique unstable interior equilibrium or no interior equilibrium at all. Therefore, either one or both lock-in regimes exit, and the stochastic processes do not differ qualitatively from those discussed in Section 3.2.
• For n/ h < 0.5 1−c /c, the minimum eigenvalue is negative. Hereẋ is increasing for low as well as for high x-values but decreasing in between. In this case, the deterministic model can have three interior equilibria: two unstable ones and between them a stable equilibrium. The latter corresponds with a metastable state of the stochastic process. Fig. 5 shows the corresponding deterministic models of three stochastic processes with c = 0.5 and h = 1 (calculated fromẋ = α(x) − x with α(x) according to Eq. (4)). Two of them are symmetric (b = 0), so that x = 0.5 is the stable equilibrium. While n = 1.15 results in an unstable equilibrium at x = 0.0275 as well as at x = 0.9725 and has lock-in regimes with x ,B = 0.015 and x ,A = 0.985, a higher network effect strength (n = 1.25) leads to larger lock-in regimes (see the blips of the functions) and to unstable equilibria which lie further inside. In the third example, network A has a systematic basic advantage of b = 0.04, so that the stable equilibrium amounts to x = 0.72. From the equilibria of these deterministic models, we can infer the qualitative properties of the stochastic processes and, thus, of a typical realization. Let us assume, for example, that A's network size is initially a little bit higher than its critical mass. Then, in the first stage, there is a considerably high probability that a realization will be locked in to network B. If, however, network A 'survives' this critical stage and succeeds in exceeding the state which corresponds to an unstable equilibrium of the deterministic model, it becomes increasingly probable that a realization fluctuates around the metastable state for a very long time. Fig. 6 provides an example for n = 1.15 and x 0 = 0.2, i.e. with an initial state to the right of the left-hand unstable equilibrium. In this case, a long-term coexistence of 7 In the special case of c = 0.5, the interior boundary states of the lock-in regimes can be calculated as both user networks is more probable than an early lock-in to B right from the start. In the first stage, however, the escape probabilities for switches from interior states to the lock-in-to-B regime are comparatively high. This becomes clear from the fact that, for t = 200, the minimum probability between states near A's critical mass and those further to the right is comparatively high. In the second stage, these escape probabilities diminish dramatically, see the distributions for t = 600 and t = 1000. Here the unimodal sub-distributions along the interior states center (more or less) symmetrically around the metastable state, which gains probability until ca. t = 800. In the third stage from ca. t = 800 onwards, this interior sub-distribution is depleted very slowly in favor of the two absorbing boundary states. Of course, for t → ∞, the whole probability mass is absorbed by these two states. This, however, can take arbitrarily long. Given the parameter specification of Fig. 6 , for example, there is still a positive probability for coexistence for t = 40 000. This must be compared with the duration of a coexistence in the absence of a Fig. 7 . Transient probability distributions of three processes with a metastable state for t = 1000 and x 0 = 0.2 (c = 0.5, h = 1).
metastable state, where a monopoly is realized (with certainty) within a by far shorter time span. 8 How strong the metastability is, i.e. how long competing user networks can coexist although the market is a natural monopoly, depends, among other things, on the general strength of the network effects. This is demonstrated in Fig. 7 via the comparison of the probability distributions for t = 1000 and x 0 = 0.2 of the processes with n = 1.15 and with n = 1.25. Obviously, stronger network effects mean a stronger tendency towards the driving out of one of the networks: the probabilities for being locked in (for being in the neighborhood of the metastable state) are higher (lower), the higher n is. This can also be deduced from the corresponding deterministic models depicted in Fig. 5 : a higher n means larger lock-in regimes and a lower eigenvalue (in absolute terms) of the stable equilibrium. Finally, in order to illustrate the effect of the existence of a systematic basic advantage of network A, Fig. 7 shows the probability distribution for t = 1000 and x 0 = 0.2 which results from b = 0.04. Here the peak of the interior distribution lies to the right of x = 0.5, and the probabilities for a lock-in to A (B) are comparatively high (low). Of special importance for realizations of this process are the relatively high escape probabilities for switches to x = 1. These are due to the fact that the distance between the metastable state (x = 0.72) and the state which corresponds to the right-hand unstable equilibrium of the deterministic model (x = 0.81) is relatively small.
Conclusions
This paper applies a dynamic version of the Discrete Choice Model to the problem of competing user networks. In order to determine the evolution of the probability distribution of the network sizes, we have employed a continuous-time Master Equation Approach with state-dependent choice rates. We have shown how these nonlinear stochastic continuous-time processes can be analyzed by means of the moment equations of the Fokker-Planck equation and/or with the help of the corresponding deterministic model. It turns out that, depending on the strength of the network effects, the extent of the horizontal differentiation (the importance of the exogeneous shocks), the significance of a systematic basic advantage and on the curvature of the network effect function, four cases can be distinguished:
• If the systematic basic advantage is relatively high, a unique absorbing state exists, and, sooner or later, every realization of a stochastic process is locked in to the network with the systematic advantage.
• If both the systematic basic advantage and the network effect strength are relatively low, the stochastic processes are ergodic; i.e. every realization of a stochastic process results in a coexistence of networks.
• If the systematic basic advantage is relatively low and the network effects are considerably strong (given the curvature of the network effect function), both lock-in regimes but no metastable state exist. Hence, there is a strong tendency towards a quick driving out of one of both networks, and it is a priori an open question as to which network this will be.
• If the systematic basic advantage is relatively low and the network effects are relatively strong but not considerably strong, the two lock-in regimes could coexist with a metastable state. Here if both networks have exceeded sufficiently their critical masses, a relatively long-lasting coexistence becomes probable, although the market is a natural monopoly. The latter can only happen when the fact that network effects are decreasing is taken into account. Unlike the second case, it can explain a long-lasting coexistence of user networks in the presence of critical masses.
